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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court unanimously held in the case of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.,t that product designs
tTahj Gomes received his J.D. and the High Technology Law Certificate from the Santa Clara
University School of Law in 1999. He is currently an associate at the law firm of Bergeson
Eliopoulos, LLP in San Jose, California, where his practice includes business and intellectual
property litigation and licensing. Mr. Gomes is a member of the High Technology Advisory
Board at Santa Clara University School of Law and coaches the High Technology Law Moot
Court teams in the Giles Sutherland Rich patent moot competition and the Saul Letowitz
trademark moot court competition. Mr. Gomes wishes to thank Carla Da Siha for her %aluable
assistance in preparing this note.
Carla De Silva will receive her J.D. from Santa Clam University School of Law in May 2001.
Ms. De Silva is the Notes Editor for the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law
Journal. Ms. De Silva would like to thank Mr. Gomes for participating in the Casenote Project
in addition to thanking all the other contributing editors and authors for volunteering their time
and effort to this project.
' Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000).
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are not inherently distinctive and therefore cannot be protected as
unregistered trade dress under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act2
unless and until the product design has developed "secondary
meaning" in the mind of the public.
II. BACKGROUND
Samara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of
children's clothing Samara Brothers' primary line of clothing is a
line of "spring/summer one piece seersucker outfits decorated with
appliques of hearts, flowers, fruits and the like. '4 Wal-Mart is a
national retailer that sells, among other things, children's clothing.5
In 1995, Wal-Mart contracted with a supplier to manufacture a
line of children's outfits based on the Samara Brothers' line of
seersuckers for sale in the 1996 spring/summer season. Wal-Mart
provided the manufacturer with photographs from the Samara
Brothers' line and the supplier dutifully copied sixteen garments
6
"with only minor modifications." 7 Wal-Mart subsequently sold the
knock-off seersuckers in 1996 for a gross profit of $1.15 million.8
Samara Brothers learned of Wal-Mart's actions in June of 1996
and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, alleging that Wal-Mart's sale of the knock-offs
infiinged the unregistered trade dress in its seersucker line of
clothing.9
After a week-long trial, the jury returned a verdict for Samara
Brothers on all counts, including the trade dress infringement claim.
Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of law arguing, inter alia,
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict
because Samara Brothers' trade dress consisted of non-distinctive
features customarily used in children's clothing and that Samara
Brothers' trade dress therefore merited no protection under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.'0 The district court denied Wal-Mart's
2 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 2000).
3 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 207.
4id.
5Id.
6 Id. at 207-8.
7 Id. at 207-8.
8 Id. at 208.
9 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205, 208.
10 Samara Bros., Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, et al., 969 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Wal-
Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205, 208.
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motion, awarded damages and attorney's fees to Samara Brothers"
and imposed an injunction barring Wal-Mart from the continued sale
of the knock-off seersuckers.12
Wal-Mart appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to the trade dress
claim. 13  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
following question: "What must be shown to establish that a product's
design is inherently distinctive for purposes of Lanham Act trade
dress protection?"'
4
111. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS
Wal-Mart argued in its brief and in oral argument that a product's
configuration, as opposed to its packaging, is descriptive of the
product by its very nature and can therefore never be inherently
distinctive. Moreover, since a product design is always descriptive of
the product, Samara Brothers should have been required to make a
showing of secondary meaning before their trade dress was protected
under the Lanham Act.15
The Court expressed some concern during oral argument that
Wal-Mart was asking it to overrule its Two Pesos decision which held
that the unique trade dress of a Mexican restaurant was inherently
distinctive and therefore protectable without proof of secondary
meaning.16 Wal-Mart responded that it was not necessary to overrule
Two Pesos because although Two Pesos established that some trade
dress may be inherently distinctive, it also left room for the possibility
that certain types of trade dress, like the color of the Press pad at issue
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., will require a
showing of secondary meaning before they can be protected under
Section 43(a).'8  Wal-Mart argued that rather than overruling Two
Pesos, the Court should confine the Two Pesos holding to cases that
n Samara Bros., 969 F. Supp. 895, 901.
12 id.
13 Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 165 F. 3d 120, 125-7 (2d Cir. 1998). The Second
Circuit refused to endorse the trade dress injunction fashioned by the district court and
remanded for a more suitable injunction. Id. at 128, 132.
14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 528 U.S. 808 (1999).
'5 1999 WL 1045142, *10, *19.
16 2000 WL 72053, *8.
'7 514 U.S. 159 (1995). In Qualitex, decided after Two Pesos, the Supreme Court held that the
green-gold color of the petitioner's products was protectable as a trademark because the color of
the product was not functional and had acquired secondary meaning.
Is 2000 WL 72053, *8.
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do not involve product configuration. Wal-Mart further argued that
this approach was entirely consistent with the Court's previous
decisions in Two Pesos and Qualitex.19
Samara Brothers countered that the same criteria should be
applied to all trade dress cases under the Two Pesos decision because
that decision had required application of the Abercrombie
distinctiveness scale20 to all trade dress cases and because the Two
Pesos court had reasoned that there was no basis for requiring
secondary meaning because the design, in that case (a restaurant), was
inherently distinctive. 21 A brief look at the opinion in the Two Pesos
case shows that the Court did indeed suggest that all trade dress cases
should be analyzed under Abercrombie, that trade dress can be
inherently distinctive and that secondary meaning is not required if a
particular trade dress is inherently distinctive:
The Fifth Circuit was quite right in Chevron, and in this case, to
follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to inquire
whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under section
43(a) is inherently distinctive. If it is, it is capable of identifying
products or services as coming from a specific source and
secondary meaning is not required. This is the rule generally
applicable to trademarks, and the protection of trademarks and
trade dress under section 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose
of preventing deception and unfair competition. There is no
persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two. The
"proposition that secondary meaning must be shown even if the
trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, [is] wrong, for the
reasons explained by Judge Rubin for the Fifth Circuit in
Chevron."
22
Samara Brothers argued that the difficulty in distinguishing
between the design and the packaging of a product would make a
secondary meaning test unworkable.23  Wal-Mart responded on
rebuttal that product configuration is descriptive by its very nature
and should, therefore, require secondary meaning. Wal-Mart also
argued that requiring secondary meaning for product designs would
"work no harm" and would bring more certainty to this area because
the Patent and Trademark Office and trademark practitioners are
'9 1999 WL 1045142, *10, 2000 WL72053, *8, *11-13.
20 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (1976).
21 1999 WL 124842, *23.
22 505 U.S. 763, 773 (citing Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
23 2000 WL 72053, *34.
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already quite familiar with the secondary meaning test.
2 4
IV. HOLDING, RATIONALE & DISCUSSION
The Court overwhelmingly agreed with Wal-Mart that it made
more sense to limit Two Pesos and reign in the expanding scope of
protection afforded to unregistered trade dress under Section 43(a)
than it did to maintain the status quo and allow the scope of Section
43(a)'s protection to expand further. Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated that "a product's design is distinctive, and
therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.
' a
Justice Scalia began the opinion by remarking that a product's
trade dress is properly considered a "symbol" or "device" subject to
protection under Lanham Act Section 43(a), notwithstanding the lack
of textual protection for trade dress26 and that the protection afforded
to trade dress under Section 43(a) has recently expanded to include
not only a product's packaging, but also the design of the product
itself.27 Justice Scalia went on to point out that although Section
43(a) includes no textual distinctiveness requirement, the courts have
universally applied a distinctiveness requirement to trade dress cases
because:
(1) without distinctiveness, a particular trade dress would not
"cause confusion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
[the subject] goods", 8 as required by Section 43(a), and;
(2) the requirements for registering a mark (or trade dress) under
Section 2 of the Lanham Act are generally applicable in
determining whether a mark (or trade dress) is protected under
Section 43(a).29
Justice Scalia also explained that the distinctiveness requirement
can be satisfied in one of two ways.30 First, a mark (or a product's
trade dress) is "inherently distinctive" if its "intrinsic nature serves to
identify a particular source."31 Second, a mark or a product's trade
24 Id. at *51-52.
2s Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205, 216.
26Id. at 209.
27Id. at 209-10.
2Id. at 210.
'9 Id Distinctiveness is required for registering trade dress under Section 2.
30
.rd
31 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205, 210 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 768 (1992)). In an apparent step back from Two Pesos, the court noted that courts apply
the Abercrombie test "in the context of word marks." 1Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210.
20011
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dress can acquire distinctiveness "even if it is not inherently
distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning. 32 A mark or
trade dress develops secondary meaning "when, in the minds of the
public the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of
the product rather than the product itself."
3
Justice Scalia specifically noted that the foundation for
differentiating between marks that are inherently distinctive and
marks that have developed secondary meaning is found in Section 2
of the Lanham Act.34 Furthermore, Section 2 of the Act specifically
states that nothing therein will prevent "the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce," 35 however, nothing in the Act "demands the
conclusion that every category of mark necessarily includes.., some
marks [that] are inherently distinctive. 36 Moreover, "with respect to
at least one category of mark-colors-[this Court has] held that no
mark can ever be inherently distinctive. 37
Having laid the ground work to follow the reasoning of the
Qualitex decision rather than Two Pesos, the Wal-Mart decision
effectively sounded the death knell for the doctrine of inherent
distinctiveness in product configuration by echoing Wal-Mart's
argument "that design, like color, is not inherently distinctive."38 The
Court proceeded by clarifying that word marks and product packaging
commonly derive their inherent distinctiveness "from the fact that the
very purpose of attaching a particular word to a product, or encasing
it in a distinctive packaging, is most often to identify the source of the
product." 39 "Consumers are... predisposed to regard [such] symbols
as indication of the producer, which is why such symbols almost
automatically tell a consumer that they refer to a brand. 40
In distinct contrast, however, product designs, like color, differ
because "consumer predisposition to equate the [design] feature with
32 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211.
33 Id. at 210-11 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11 (1982).
Although the court noted that the term "secondary meaning" is strictly accurate only when
applied to word marks, it opted to follow the conventional terminology. Id.
34Id. at 211; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (West 2000).
35 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(0 (2000).
36 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211.
37 Id. (citing Qualitex, supra note 17, at 162-63).
3' Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 212.
39id.
40 Id. at 212 (citing Abercrombie, supra note 20, at 162-63 (internal quotes omitted)).
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the source does not exist."41 On the contrary, "[c]onsumers are aware
of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product
designs-such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin-is
intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself
more useful or more appealing."42 Wal-Mart is an apparent attempt
by the Court to judicially recognize this reality.
The Wal-Mart Court reasoned that requiring a prerequisite
showing of secondary meaning for unregistered product designs
would ultimately serve to protect new market entrants from "anti-
competitive strike suit[s],"'"4 by removing an environment that
"facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness. '"4
The Court unanimously rejected the suggestion that it adopt a
hybrid of the Seabrook test for determining inherent distinctiveness of
a product design.45 The Seabrook test is inadequate because it
"would rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an
anticompetitive strike suit," and furthermore, because that test could
not even be applied to the facts of the case itself, let alone trade dress
cases.
46
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that any apparent harshness of
their new, bright line rule was mitigated by a producer's ability to
seek a design patent or copyright protection for the design of its
products.47 It also reiterated that its decision in Wal-Mart was not
directly in conflict with Two Pesos and that Two Pesos had absolutely
no bearing on the Wal-Mart case because the design of the restaurant
in Two Pesos was more akin to product packaging or "some tertitn
quid,"48 than it was to product design.49
411d. at 213.
42 rd.
431d. at 214.
' Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 213.
4
11d at 213-14.
' Id. at 214. The Seabrook test was derived from a 1977 product packaging decision by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The test, "in determining the inherent distinctiveness of a
product's packaging, considered, among other things, 'whether it was a 'common' basic shap.-
or design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, [and] % hcther it was a mere
refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-knowm form ofomarmentation for a particular class
of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods." Id. (citing Seabrook
Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
47 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 214.
4s A middle course or an intermediate component. For example, "where there ar- two systems
of law and two orders of courts, there must.., be some tertium quid to deal with conflicts of
law and jurisdiction." MERRiAM-WEBSTER ONTNE DICTIONARY at http(www m-w~com (last
visited Apr. 23, 2001).
2001]
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Any doubt that the Court took the practical approach was
virtually eliminated by their response to Samara Brothers' argument
that the manner in which it distinguished Two Pesos may "force
courts to draw difficult lines between product-design and product-
packaging trade dress." 50 The Court acknowledged that "there will
indeed be some hard cases" to be dealt with "at the margin," but
predicted that "the frequency and the difficulty of having to
distinguish between product design and product packaging will be
much less than the frequency and the difficulty of having to decide
when a product design is inherently distinctive.
'
"
5
'
The motivation behind the Supreme Court's approach was
confirmed when, in closing, Justice Scalia provided the following
advice to courts confronted with distinguishing between product
design and product packaging trade dress: "[t]o the extent that there
are close cases . . . courts should err on the side of caution and
classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring
secondary meaning.,
52
V. CONCLUSION
There is little practical value in waxing philosophical about the
bright-line rule drawn by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart v. Samara
Brothers. As trademark practitioners, perhaps we should be satisfied
with the knowledge that, for now, the practical approach by the Court
has simplified this murky area of trademark practice and, like
Voltaire's character "Candide," be content to simply "cultivate our
garden. 53
49 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 215.
50id.
5"Id.
53 VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 30:159 (presented by the Electronic Literature Foundation) at
http://elf.chaoscafe.con/voltaire/candied (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
